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ABSTRACT 
Popular consensus exists that the 2007 surge of U.S. forces in Iraq led to 
an improved security environment.  The surge was designed to reduce violence 
and improve security by protecting the Iraqi population—a change in strategy.  
According to the consensus, the security environment improved due to the surge, 
measured by the decreasing number of attacks.  
For this thesis, the security environment consists of the number of attacks 
and their lethality, supported by data from the Congressional Research Service.  
This thesis compares the timelines of the surge forces with the numbers of 
attacks, with the lethality of those attacks, and with factors other than the surge 
that may have improved the security environment.  This thesis argues that the 
surge and associated strategy may have hastened improvement to the security 
environment, but they were neither necessary nor sufficient for the improvements 
in the security environment.   
Several theories and conflict models offer insight into how improvement in 
the security environment occurred:  through efforts that countered insurgent 
sanctuary and social support, and consequently decreased the lethality of 
insurgent attacks.  This analysis reveals that the political efforts of the Iraqi 
government and grass roots movements were the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for improvement.  
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
II. THE INSURGENCY AND PRE-SURGE MILITARY RESPONSE .................. 5 
A. MECHANISMS OF INSURGENT CONTROL OVER THE 
POPULATION...................................................................................... 5 
B. THE U.S. MILITARY—COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, AND 
APPROACH ......................................................................................... 7 
C. “A WAY OF BATTLE”....................................................................... 10 
III. THE SURGE ................................................................................................. 13 
A. COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, AND MISSION OF SURGE 
FORCES ............................................................................................ 13 
B. SURGE DATA ANALYSIS................................................................. 15 
C. ATTACKS, LETHALITY, AND TIMELINES....................................... 19 
D. WHY INSURGENT LETHALITY IS IMPORTANT.............................. 21 
E. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES ........................................... 23 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT......................................................................... 25 
A. IRAQI PROVINCIAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS ... 25 
B. WHY THE SURGE WAS INSUFFICIENT .......................................... 32 
C. EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS ..... 35 
V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 43 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 47 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 51 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. U.S. Personnel (Operations) and Number of Attacks After (Iraqi and 
Afghanistan:  Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to 
Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies).............. 15 
Figure 2. Monthly Attacks in Iraq (Civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and Allied 
Forces) From (Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq)..................... 17 
Figure 3. Allied Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilian Deaths  (January 
2006–November 2007) From (Measuring Security and Stability in 
Iraq). ................................................................................................... 20 
Figure 4. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes 
(expected winners in cells) From (How the Weak Win Wars: A 
Theory of Asymmetric Conflict). ......................................................... 36 
Figure 5. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction (Strong Actor 
Direct/Indirect, Weak Actor Indirect) After (How the Weak Win 
Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict)............................................. 38 
Figure 6. Lyall–Wilson Graph of Conditional Effect of Mechanization on 
Probability of Incumbent Win 1918–2005 From (Rage Against the 
Machines:  Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars). ......... 40 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A popular consensus exists among United States Army leadership and 
civilian policy makers that the 2007 surge of United States forces in Iraq led to 
the improved security environment in that country.  The surge was designed to 
reduce violence and improve security by protecting the Iraqi population in 
Baghdad; the emphasis on protecting the population from insurgent violence was 
considered a change in strategy.  According to the consensus, as a result of the 
United States’ military efforts to protect the Iraqi population from violence in 
Baghdad—and the increase in the total number of U.S. Troops operating from 
decentralized outposts to reinforce Iraqi efforts that were part of this strategy—
the security environment steadily improved as measured by the decreasing 
number of attacks on Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.   
In order to address the validity of the consensus view, this thesis will 
analyze the security environment and stability in Iraq using data from the 
Congressional Research Service.  Although the consensus view has been 
supported by correlating the increasing number of surge forces with decreasing 
numbers of attack, for the purposes of this thesis, the security environment will 
be defined as consisting of the total number of attacks and their lethality.  For 
reasons that will become clear, the lethality of attacks is a better measure of the 
security environment than merely the numbers of attacks because the lethality of 
attacks reveals factors, other than the surge, that may also have led to an 
improvement in the security environment.   
This thesis will compare the timelines of the arrival of the surge forces with 
the numbers of attacks, the lethality of those attacks, and with factors other than 
the surge that may have improved the security environment—such as Iraqi 
political efforts.  In contrast to the consensus view on why the surge worked, this 
thesis will argue that the surge forces and associated strategy may have 
hastened improvement to the security environment, but they were neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the significant improvements observed in the security 
 xii
environment.  Various theories and conflict models suggest that the United 
States was in a less favorable position to achieve success in Iraq than 
proponents of the consensus view contend.  Applying these theories and models 
to the Iraq conflict offer insight into how an improvement in the security 
environment occurred: specifically, through efforts that countered insurgent 
sanctuary and social support, and consequently decreased the lethality of 
insurgent attacks.  This analysis reveals that other factors, primarily the political 
efforts of the Iraqi Provincial and Central governments, and grass roots 
movements were the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement in the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A popular consensus exists among United States Army leadership and 
civilian policy makers that the 2007 surge of United States forces in Iraq led to 
the improved security environment in that country.  The surge was designed to 
reduce violence and improve security by protecting the Iraqi population in 
Baghdad; the emphasis on protecting the population from insurgent violence was 
considered a change in strategy.  According to the consensus, as a result of the 
United States’ military efforts to protect the Iraqi population from violence in 
Baghdad—and the increase in the total number of U.S. Troops operating from 
decentralized outposts to reinforce Iraqi efforts that were part of this strategy—
the security environment steadily improved as measured by the decreasing 
number of attacks on Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.  Due to the apparent 
correlation between the deployment of the Surge Forces and the decrease in the 
numbers of attacks, prominent figures and authors such as President George W. 
Bush,1 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,2 Bob Woodward,3 Thomas 
Ricks,4 Peter Mansoor,5 John Nagl,6 and others have argued that the surge was 
the mechanism by which improvement in the security environment in Iraq was 
achieved. Ricks explains the success of the surge through interviews with 
American Military personnel in his book The Gamble, while Bob Woodward does 
                                            
1 President George W. Bush, “The Surge in Iraq Worked,” in The LA Times Countdown to 
Crawford, July 31, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/presidentbush/2008/07/iraq-win 
(accessed September 16, 2009). 
2 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “One Surge does not Fit All,” in The New York 
Times, November 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/opinion/23rumsfeld.html? 
(accessed September 16, 2009). 
3 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008). 
4 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009). 
5 Peter Mansoor, “How the Surge Worked,” in The Washington Post, August 10, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/opinion/columns/index.html (accessed 
September 16, 2009). 
6 John Nagl, “We Can't Win these Wars on Our Own,” in The Washington Post, March 9, 
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/0 (accessed September 16, 
2009). 
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the same with White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State 
personnel in his account, The War Within.  Kimberly Kagan supports similar 
conclusions in her book The Surge: A Military History.7  
In order to address the validity of the consensus view, this thesis will 
analyze the security environment and stability in Iraq using data from the 
Congressional Research Service.  Although the consensus view has been 
supported by correlating the increasing number of surge forces with decreasing 
numbers of attack, for the purposes of this thesis, the security environment will 
be defined as consisting of the total number of attacks and their lethality.  For 
reasons that will become clear, the lethality of attacks is a better measure of the 
security environment than merely the numbers of attacks because the lethality of 
attacks reveals factors, other than the surge, that may also have led to an 
improvement in the security environment.   
This thesis will compare the timelines of the arrival of the surge forces with 
the numbers of attacks, the lethality of those attacks, and with factors other than 
the surge that may have improved the security environment—such as Iraqi 
political efforts.  In contrast to the consensus view on why the surge worked, this 
thesis will argue that the surge forces and associated strategy may have 
hastened improvement to the security environment, but they were neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the significant improvements observed in the security 
environment.  Various theories and conflict models suggest that the United 
States was in a less favorable position to achieve success in Iraq than 
proponents of the consensus view contend.  Applying these theories and models 
to the Iraq conflict in Chapter IV will offer insight into how an improvement in the 
security environment occurred: specifically, through efforts that countered 
insurgent sanctuary and social support, and consequently decreased the lethality 
of insurgent attacks.  This analysis reveals that other factors, primarily the  
 
                                            
7 Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York:  Encounter books, 2008). 
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political efforts of the Iraqi Provincial and Central governments, and grass roots 
movements were the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement in the 
security environment.  
In order to understand arguments about the surge and what improved 
security in Iraq, it is necessary to briefly review what we know about the 
insurgency.  Following that review, the thesis will outline the U.S. military's 
approach to the conflict prior to the surge, and continue with an analysis of surge 
efforts based on measures of insurgent effectiveness—numbers of attacks 
versus lethality of attacks. Assuming the soundness of this argument, the 
conclusion of the thesis extrapolates lessons from Iraq and considers future 
application of similar methods in new areas of conflict.   
 
  4
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II. THE INSURGENCY AND PRE-SURGE MILITARY 
RESPONSE 
The insurgency in Iraq consisted of three separate but overlapping 
conflicts:  the Sunni insurgency against the central government consisting of 
former Ba'athists; Al-Qaeda's violent network attempting to establish a foothold in 
a new venue in western/northern Iraq; and the sectarian violence perpetuated by 
existing ethnic tensions between Shia and Sunni militia groups or factions.8  
Each of these groups employed similar tactics:  “attacks on Americans, 
sabotage, attacks on Iraqis who supported the new political order, and 
occasional spectacular terrorist acts.”9 The targets of all three of these groups 
were the various city, provincial and central levels of government, and the 
groups’ goals included “overthrowing the political order within a given territory, 
using a combination of subversion, terrorism, guerilla warfare, and 
propaganda.”10 Each group was successful at integrating into the population and 
controlling territorial sanctuaries through intimidation, coercion, and violence, but 
also by establishing mechanisms of control over the population such as self-
imposed governance and the rationing of resources.   
A. MECHANISMS OF INSURGENT CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION  
In al Anbar Province and the Jazeera Desert, Al Qaeda primarily used 
violence and intimidation to coerce the population into providing sanctuary and 
support.  In southern Iraq, the Shia Militias used violence and rationing of 
essential services.  In Baghdad, the Shia Militias used violence and rationing, 
and backed these efforts with political support from Shia government officials or 
Security Forces officers.  For example, the ethnic violence perpetrated by Shia 
and Sunni factions was exacerbated by existing tensions, but the actual short-
                                            
8 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008), 92 
9 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 
2008): 152.  
10 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 12. 
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term goal of mid-level insurgents and power brokers within tribal areas and 
districts was to grab land and essential services/resources; the result of which 
became an expanded power base of insurgent and militia leaders in the absence 
of legitimate governance.  The rationing of essential services by the insurgents to 
the population centers created dependency on the insurgents and provided a 
mechanism of control over the population beyond simple intimidation.  At best, 
these violent efforts were often ignored by Shia, or else facilitated by the very 
government agencies and security forces responsible for the area.  In fact, many 
insurgent groups established their own miniature “kingdoms” of sanctuary around 
the country to “create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, 
and impose their own respective political and religious agendas.”11 The 
population often provided passive support to insurgents out of necessity for 
essential services provided by insurgents, and was not the product of intimidation 
alone.  For example, although insurgent leaders would force people from their 
homes through intimidation and the use of force, the insurgents employed 
resource control mechanisms to influence the remaining citizens; including 
rationing black-market gasoline and liquid propane gas, controlling electrical 
substations and irrigation pumps, employing traffic control points, closing banks, 
limiting hospital visits and medical care, and influencing Judges and politicians.  
In exchange for the limited provision of these essential services, Iraqis were 
coerced into allowing insurgents to operate in their area, effectively creating the 
sanctuary and social support necessary for the continued success of the 
insurgents.12  Any ejection of insurgents from a neighborhood by U.S. forces did 
not erase a citizen's need for essential services, originally provided by the 
insurgents and subsequently unavailable through the national and provincial 
governments.  Iraqis often needed the insurgent and militia organizations to 
remain in order to provide necessities unavailable through legitimate means.  
                                            
11 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 174.  
12 The discussion of insurgent sanctuary and social support will be addressed in more detail 
in later chapters.   
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Furthermore, these groups often sabotaged the infrastructure not directly 
controlled by militias and insurgents, targeting oil pipelines, water systems, 
electric substations, and key bridges, in an effort to discredit the ability of U.S. 
forces to provide for the Iraqis.  Insurgents understood that “a country’s rulers—
the Americans in this case—were blamed for the lack of water, electricity, and 
fuel even when the insurgents themselves were responsible.”13 The ability of the 
insurgents and militias to control or disrupt infrastructure was so pervasive that 
many Iraqis believed that the U.S. “failure to [protect infrastructure] was intended 
to punish or dishonor them.”14  
As the insurgents organized and adapted into larger and more effective 
groups from 2003 through 2006, the United States struggled to overcome their 
effects on the Allied U.S./Iraqi political apparatus.  
B. THE U.S. MILITARY—COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, AND APPROACH 
In order to understand how the United States Military approached the 
conflict in Iraq, we must first understand the design, function, and fundamental 
tasks of the military.  For the surge's change in strategy and increased troop 
numbers to have been the cause of improvement in the security environment, a 
military that was designed for traditional warfare and failed to improve the 
security environment by employing conventional methods prior to 2007, would 
have to have undergone an unprecedented transformation15 in a very short time, 
begging the question of whether a change did in fact occur.   
                                            
13 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 147. 
14 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 146.   
Anthony H. Cordesman, and Arleigh A. Burke, “The Changing Situation in Iraq:  A Progress 
Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2009): http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/ 
(accessed May 20, 2009): 2.   
Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Jason H. Campbell, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of 
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, February 19, 2009 (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institute, [2009]), http://www.brookings.edu/ (accessed April 19, 2009): 23. 
15 On the difficulties of transforming under fire, see Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War:  
Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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The U.S. military was wholly unprepared for the stabilization/ 
reconstruction and counterinsurgency missions.  Leading up to the conflict in 
Iraq, U.S. military training, technology, culture, and mission were focused on a 
set of objectives and principles different from counterinsurgency, and efforts at 
innovation for improvement were limited by a rigid set of institutional norms 
stemming from the post-Gulf War period.  The reliance on technology to gain 
superiority over a qualitatively inferior enemy was the hallmark of the American 
“military-technology revolution,” or later the “revolution in military affairs.”16 This 
revolution clearly highlighted the reliance on speed, audacity, and dominant 
firepower with precision strike ability and low friendly casualty figures (congruent 
with the outcome of the Gulf War).  The American revolution of military capability 
did not include “political subtlety and cultural understanding”17 and in fact, 
ignored these aspects of warfare by deferring such engagements to politicians 
and diplomats, as part of a grand strategy employing all the elements of 
statecraft.18 Consequently, the Government of Iraq's demands for U.S. political 
assistance in Baghdad and advisory assistance to provincial governments 
overwhelmed the wholly inadequate political-advisory capacity of the military.  
Such advisory tasks included the establishment of a Constitutional Democracy, 
election of public officials, economic policy generation, etc.  The U.S. focused 
instead on defeating armed threats against the Allied U.S. and Iraqi government.  
The military and civilian leaders were not prepared to address the security, 
political, and later economic issues stemming from the actions of the insurgents 
and militias.  The U.S. Military's historical and deliberate separation from political 
involvement, economic engagement, and the population inside a host-nation, 
because of its emphasis on enemy-centric warfare, imposed limitations on its 
                                            
16 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 47.  
17 Ibid., 46.  
18 Instruments of Statecraft refer to Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic foreign 
policy measures employed to accomplish a strategic objective.  Also known as the Elements of 
National Power.   
  9
ability to translate battlefield success into the accomplishment of a strategic 
objective—to rebuild Iraq from the ground up.19  
In the prelude to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. politicians and 
statesmen concurred with the division of labor between the military and other 
government agencies, as demonstrated by foreign policy advisor20 Condoleeza 
Rice's statement in early 2000: 
[The military] is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police 
force.  It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not 
designed to build a civilian society. Military force is best used to 
support clear political goals, whether limited, such as expelling 
Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the 
unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War 
II.21   
Fundamentally, the military was designed to “prevent bad things rather than 
engineer desired results, a negative force rather than a positive one.”22 The U.S. 
military found itself in 2003 with tasks that it was not designed to do, and certain 
political decisions did not enable the military’s efforts.  For example, in order to 
protect the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from former Ba'athists and to 
prevent a military coup against the U.S. governing body in Iraq, Ambassador 
Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military.  However, a large population of 
unemployed and angry men with military skills contributed to a situation worse 
than a security vacuum:  a nation ripe for insurgency.   
                                            
19 The stated objective in Iraq was “regime change,” but later included rebuilding the Iraqi 
Security Forces, establishing a Constitutional Democracy, ensuring viable economic policies, and 
solving deep-rooted ethnic differences among the religious factions in Iraq. 
20 Rice was the foreign policy advisor to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush 
during speech. 
Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the national interest,” Foreign Affairs, 79, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 
2000), http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~jwestern/ir319/condoleezza_rice.htm (accessed May 28, 
2009). 
Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 
2008): 47. 
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C. “A WAY OF BATTLE” 
Throughout the Iraq conflict, the U.S. Military focused on a strategy to 
improve the security environment by attacking and limiting insurgent personnel 
and resources in each of the insurgent groups.23 Military units employed a 
combination of lethal (raids, air strikes, small kill teams) and non-lethal means 
(infrastructure projects such as schools and wells). However, until 2007 most 
military operations were conducted from centralized bases against low-level 
insurgent operators, and predominantly focused on active defensive measures,24 
such as counter-Improvised Explosive Device and counter-rocket missions or 
cache recovery.  For example, many missions consisted of “movement to 
contact” patrols where U.S. forces would drive through an area reported to 
contain insurgents and wait for the enemy to initiate contact with bombs or small 
arms fire, and then retaliate.25 Military forces were often compromised by 
insurgent early-warning networks long before the forces’ arrival in their target 
areas, thus increasing the risk to the force and the risk to the success of the 
mission.  A report from the U.S. Headquarters in Iraq dated August 25, 2006, 
indicates that during the second phase of Operation Together Forward II, an 
operation carried out before the surge, 33,009 buildings had been cleared and 70 
insurgents detained.26  This means that 0.002 insurgents were captured for every 
building cleared.   
As aggressive military raids and searches of Iraqi homes based on little or 
no intelligence continued through 2007, many Iraqi citizens could not help but 
view such efforts as both insulting and as evidence of gross incompetence on the 
part of the combined U.S. and Iraqi government.27 The cost of such raids 
included a further loss of population support for military efforts, and an increased 
                                            
23 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 130. 
24 Ibid.,136. 
25 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009): 12. 
26 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 105. 
27 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 156 
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active or passive support for the insurgents, without much gained in terms of 
actual insurgents captured.  The detention of insurgents produced only a limited 
reduction of insurgent capacity during operations, as many were released shortly 
after capture due to lack of evidence, or more specifically, a lack of desire by 
Iraqi judges to sentence Iraqis who attacked Americans:  this program was aptly 
named the “catch and release policy.”28 Further outlining the continued failure of 
the Military's pre-surge strategy, a report to the National Command Authority 
highlighted the initial trend of violence perpetuated by insurgents in 2004 which 
continued through 2007:  “They [insurgents] have a strategy . . . All the 
measurements – the attack data, the logistics, the financing, external support, 
freedom of movement, ability to recruit—all these trend lines are going one 
way—up.”29  
Having reviewed briefly pre-surge military efforts, we may now look at the 
surge and the data that supports the consensus viewpoint.   
                                            
28 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 81. 
29 Ibid., 25 
  12
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III. THE SURGE 
The U.S. military attempted to improve the security environment through a 
tactical approach toward enemy combatants, without establishing viable political 
and economic institutions through the early years of the Iraq conflict.  As the U.S. 
domestic political will for the Iraq War effort waned, a conceptually radical 
strategy was concocted in 2006 to counter the growing security threat in Iraq:  a 
25,000–soldier troop surge to supplement the 120,000 service members in Iraq.  
As a result of the deteriorating security environment in Iraq and waning domestic 
U.S. support for military efforts there, the Secretary of Defense, with support from 
President George Bush, deemed a change of strategy necessary.  A review by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff resulted in the deployment of five Army Brigades to Iraq 
in support of Prime Minister Maliki's 10 Army Brigade “surge of forces” to 
Baghdad.30 The Commanding General of Multi-National Forces–Iraq, George 
Casey was replaced by General David Petraeus in January 2007.  The security 
environment subsequently improved in late 2007 and 2008 while other CRS 
indicators of improvement trended favorably toward U.S. and Iraqi interests.  
A. COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, AND MISSION OF SURGE FORCES 
The surge of U.S. forces in 2007 was limited in the numbers of troops 
available to deploy into the Iraqi theater of operations (approximately five 
brigades or 20,000 soldiers) and limited in its scope to Baghdad and surrounding 
areas.31 The planning considerations for the troop surge included primary factors 
such as:  25 percent of the population of Iraq was in or near Baghdad, and 30 
percent of all violence occurred in the same area.32 Planning for the surge also 
                                            
30 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 255. 
31 Ibid., 117, 250.  
32 Data reflects time period of February 2005 through May 2008. Michael E. O'Hanlon and 
Jason H. Campbell, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam 
Iraq, February 19, 2009 (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, [2009]), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
(accessed April 19, 2009). 
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included the idea that there is a critical troops-to-conflict ratio,33 and by adding 
surge forces, the United States could tip the scales of the number of troops 
toward a favorable force ratio.  The surge troops were employed as an economy 
of force mission intended to gain the maximum anticipated return on security 
improvements in the largest segment of the country's population center.   
As previously noted, authors Thomas Ricks,34 Bob Woodward,35 Kimberly 
Kagan,36 and others describe some of the factors that are popularly believed to 
have increased stability in Iraq in 2008, focusing primarily on the military strategy 
reform.37  The military strategy implemented by Generals Petraeus and Odierno 
involved moving large numbers of troops from centralized bases into the population 
centers, and directing soldiers to protect Iraqi civilians from ethnically motivated 
political violence.  The concept was that by protecting the population, the population 
would protect their protectors by volunteering information to actively disrupt 
insurgent networks, and Allied efforts would thereby gain popular support. 
The surge strategy appeared to reflect counterinsurgency doctrine:  
continue to reduce insurgent capacity through conventional attacks from 
outposts, thereby also protecting the population near the outpost from insurgent 
attack.  This decentralized strategy more efficiently separated innocents from 
insurgents and reduced collateral damage during conventional attacks.  The 
subsequently reduced collateral damage (an insurgent mobilizer) then reduced 
popular support for the insurgency.  The surge consisted of a series of aggregate 
“clear, hold, build” operations in the city's districts.38  These efforts were large 
                                            
33 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counter-
Insurgency Operations, http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine, (accessed 21 August 2009): para. 
1-67. 
34 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009). 
35 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008). 
36 Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York:  Encounter books, 2008). 
37 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009): 106. 
38 Approximately one-quarter of the population of Iraq resides in Baghdad.  The commitment 
of surge forces to Baghdad was an “economy of force” mission, maximizing U.S. troop strength 
against the largest population center.   
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scale operations conducted under the umbrella surge campaign and involved the 
same conventional attack tactics employed by U.S. forces against insurgents as 
in previous years, except from decentralized outposts.  In fact, Thomas Ricks’ 
interviews indicate that the surge allowed soldiers to interact with the population 
from their outposts and gain more detailed information for targeting and 
conventional attacks against insurgents.39 This preceding analysis indicates that 
the efforts of the surge troops were not a change in strategy, simply a change in 
troop disposition and tactics.   
B. SURGE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 1.   U.S. Personnel (Operations) and Number of Attacks After (Iraqi and 
Afghanistan:  Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to 
Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies).40 
                                            
39 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009) 176.   
40 Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers—Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi and Afghanistan:  
Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in 
U.S. Strategies,” (Testimony to House of Representatives, March 25, 2009), 
http://www.gao.gov/index.html (accessed May 27, 2009).  
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If we look at the number of attacks and compare that to the number of 
troops in Iraq, we see evidence that supports the consensus view.  Figure 1 
demonstrates the correlation of decreasing attacks against coalition forces, Iraqi 
Security Forces, and civilians over time compared with the increasing number of 
United States troops in the conflict.  Attacks increase following troop level 
declines and decrease following troop level increases, just as the doctrinal 
troops-to-insurgents ratio predicts in the Army's new Counterinsurgency 
Manual.41 June–August 2007 appears to be the tipping point, where a critical 
number of U.S. personnel enabled the improvement to the security environment.  
This correlation appears to confirm the consensus view that the surge forces 
were responsible for the decline in attacks and subsequent improvement in the 
security environment.   
As previously noted, Ricks and others conclude that a U.S. troop increase 
of roughly a 15 percent combined with the decentralized strategy in 2007 led to 
improved security in 2008.  However, as the following analysis of CRS data and 
lethality of attacks demonstrates, other factors must have contributed to the 
decline in violence.   
                                                                                                                                  
Author generated line of U.S. Troop numbers.  Information gathered from Michael E. 
O'Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in 
Post-Saddam Iraq, February 19, 2009 (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, [2009]), 
http://www.brookings.edu/ (accessed April 19, 2009). 
41 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual (FM) 3–24 Counter-




Figure 2.   Monthly Attacks in Iraq (Civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and Allied 
Forces) From (Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq).42 
First, “Figure 2–Monthly Attacks in Iraq,” indicates a decline in the number 
of attacks conducted by insurgents from January 2007 through April of 2007, 
followed by two months of increased attacks during May and June.  The total 






                                            
42 Congressional Research Service, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,” September 
2007 Report to Congress, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/ (accessed 6 
March, 2009): 19. 
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Although data in Figure 2 is included in the average daily attacks in Figure 1, 
Figure 2's timeline is narrower and depicts a month-by-month look at the number 
of attacks.43   
The increase of attacks in May and June of 2007 is most likely due to the 
arrival of surge forces in Iraq and their subsequent distribution throughout 
Baghdad as part of the new decentralized strategy:  a greater number of troops 
distributed over a larger area and conducting offensive operations created more 
targets for the insurgents to attack.  This appears the most likely reason for the 
increase in attacks, however others may exist such as attacks conducted by 
Maqtada al-Sadr's “Jaysh al-Mahdi” militia.  As noted before, observing the 
timeline in the months well after the surge of forces, it would appear that the 
surge troops and change in tactics are responsible for the decline of violence that 
followed their arrival, which, in turn, has led to the popular theory of the surge.  
However, a look at the detailed timeline of attacks in Figure 2 indicates a 
decrease in attacks beginning near January 2007, a month earlier than the arrival 
of the first Brigade of surge troops44 and months before the full commitment of 
the five Brigades, which arrived between March and May with full integration into 
the fight by the end of May.  The 1st Cavalry Division, the unit assigned to 
Baghdad prior to the surge effort, began to decentralize its troop disposition in 
January 2007.45 However, the changed disposition of 1st Cavalry Division troops 
and its use of the “protect the population strategy” beginning in January is 
unlikely to explain the decrease in numbers of attacks in February.  It is critical to 
understand that the gains achieved by surge forces in Baghdad, such as earning 
support of the local population, took several months to accomplish.46 It took time 
                                            
43 The data line in Figure 1 does not clearly represent a decline in attacks from January 2007 
through April 2007.  The reason for this is twofold:  the Figure 1 x-axis data points reflect two-
month intervals, degrading the clarity of individual months.  Secondly, the data line represents 
average daily attacks, further degrading the trend line's representation of the timeline described 
here.   
44 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009): 165. 
45 Ibid., 165.  
46 Ibid., 176. 
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to win the support of the population and for the population to provide information 
to Allied forces so they could effectively identify and attack insurgents.  Offensive 
surge operations against insurgents gained momentum during the spring of 
2007, and insurgent counter-attacks elevated the attack data in May and June, 
but the surge forces and the change in the disposition of forces cannot explain 
the months-long downward trend in the number of attacks that began in January 
2007.47  
C. ATTACKS, LETHALITY, AND TIMELINES 
A further analysis of casualty rates versus numbers of attacks suggests a 
different conclusion.  By comparing the number of insurgent attacks against 
Coalition forces and civilians in Figure 2 with the numbers of casualties 
presented in Figure 3 (SIGACT III reporting) one can see that the number of 
deaths from insurgent attacks decreased significantly in November–December 
2006, while the number of attacks increased.  If the number of attacks increased 
while the number of casualties declined, the effectiveness, or lethality of 
insurgent attacks decreased.  This analysis reveals that the lethality of insurgent 
attacks against the U.S. Military, Iraqi Security Forces, and civilians eroded 
significantly beginning in October–November 2006 and sharply in December, 
never regaining the effectiveness previously demonstrated in 2006.  This 
analysis remains true for CIOC Trends reporting for the December–January 2007 
timeframe in Figure 3.  The arrival of surge troops and the new disposition of 
U.S. forces beginning in January 2007 cannot explain the degraded lethality of 
insurgents beginning in late 2006. The key time period for further analysis of 
“what worked to improve the security environment” is, therefore, October 2006 to 
January 2007.  
                                            
47 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009): 171. 
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Figure 3.   Allied Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilian Deaths  
(January 2006–November 2007) From (Measuring Security and 
Stability in Iraq).48 
To this point, the lethality data has concerned all areas of Iraq.  If we look 
at lethality in specific areas where U.S. troops were present (SIGACAT III 
Reporting—the bottom three lines—purple, green, and blue), it indicates that 
lethality decreased markedly in Coalition forces’ areas beginning in October–
November 2006.  Although the surge strategy was not implemented on a large 
scale until February 2007, other units did begin to implement the Baghdad 
                                            
48 Congressional Research Service, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,” December 
2007 Report to Congress, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/ (accessed 
March 6, 2009): 1. 
SIGACT is an acronym for Significant Activities or Action, describing a prescribed set of 
reporting requirements for U.S. units in Iraq to their headquarters.   
CIOC is an acronym for Combined Intelligence Operations Center, describing the routing of 
reporting from Combined (predominantly Iraqi, but includes other forces present in theater) unit 
headquarters to the common database originated.   
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“protect the population” strategy as early as January 2007.  This implementation 
may have occurred before the arrival and decentralization of surge forces, and 
even longer before their presence began to take effect, but the decline in lethality 
in October–November is not explained by changes of U.S. strategy or force 
disposition in January 2007.  Additionally, lethality declined in the areas where 
U.S. troops were not present in December 2006–January 2007.   The top trend 
line (CIOC Trends reporting—orange color) in Figure 3 is indicative of reports of 
civilian deaths where Coalition forces were not present, indicating that the surge 
forces had no direct bearing on the decline in civilian deaths.   
The lethality of attacks escalated during September and November 2006 
(Figure 3, SIGACT III, where U.S. troops are present), most likely due to the final 
efforts of Shia Militias and Al Qaeda to seize areas of control in and around 
Baghdad,49 and again in December (Figure 4, CIOC Trends, where U.S. troops 
are not present) in other areas of the country such as al-Anbar Province, where 
Sunni Tribes continued to fight Al Qaeda.50 These two brief increases of 
insurgent lethality indicate the final efforts of insurgents to wage effective warfare 
on a large scale but the overall trend in lethality in these months prior to the 
surge is downward., Neither the action of surge forces nor the actions of other 
forces can explain declining lethality in Iraq from October to January 2007.  
D. WHY INSURGENT LETHALITY IS IMPORTANT 
The lethality of insurgent attacks is critical in evaluating insurgent and 
counterinsurgent efforts for two reasons.  First, lethality of attacks is a better 
measure of insurgent effectiveness than number of attacks.  Drive-by shootings 
do not suggest the same kind of capability as do the same number of technically 
complicated, carefully hidden, well-timed improvised explosive devices.  Second, 
the more lethal attacks are, the more they have political consequences.  
                                            
49 Congressional Research Service, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,” March 2007 
Report to Congress, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/ (accessed March 6, 
2009): 3. 
50 Ibid., 17.  
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Although any accumulation of attacks has political consequences, the number of 
human lives lost often increases the political effectiveness of the attack.51 Loss of 
life, particularly innocent civilians, demonstrates the inability of the government to 
act like a government, degrading the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
governing bodies. G.L. Lamborn adds to this argument by describing that, “When 
a government fails at its central tasks of protecting the people and providing 
effective administration, it will lose public support and risks being replaced by a 
shadow regime that will assume quasi- governmental powers.”52 Furthermore, 
such perceptions of government incompetence do not foster the favor of the 
governed population, but instead allow insurgents to shift previously neutral 
citizens toward both active and passive support of their organizations.  Attacks 
producing large numbers of killed and wounded, highly lethal attacks, suggest a 
high level of insurgent tactical and political capability and effectiveness, even if 
the overall number of attacks is declining.  What makes highly lethal attacks 
possible is the ability of insurgents to operate under the relative protection of 
sanctuary with resourcing from social support networks.   
Insurgent sanctuaries typically provide a means to conduct training, refit 
and repair equipment, plan future operations, and recruit new members.  The 
ability of insurgents to gather intelligence, plan future operations, and resource 
those operations with well-constructed attack material and training over time and 
within the concealment of sanctuary, speaks to their increased lethality in 
subsequent attacks.  The degree of lethality of insurgent attacks is directly 
related to their sanctuary and level of population support.53  Insurgent social 
support networks among the willing, neutral, or coerced population allows for 
food and equipment resupply, medical provisions, access to lethal hardware, 
                                            
51 This statement is not an absolute, as the Samarra Mosque bombing in February 2006 
ignited ethnic violence and political turmoil to a degree previously unseen.   
52  G.L Lamborn, “The People in Arms:  A Practitioner's Guide to Understanding Insurgency 
and Dealing with it Effectively,” Small Wars Journal, (June 2009): 37. 
53 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual (FM) 3–24 Counter-
Insurgency Operations, http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine, (accessed 21 August 2009): 1–
16. 
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freedom of movement, financial gain, and access to essential services.  By not 
addressing the problem of sanctuary and population support, the Government 
allows the insurgency the time and ability to recover from short-duration 
conventional attacks, and thus fails to degrade the insurgency over the long-
term. 
E. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
The data shows that both the decline in the numbers of attacks and their 
lethality occurred before the surge in forces and its associated change in tactics 
could have produced these two effects.  In addition, attacks and lethality 
decreased in areas where no surge forces operated and the change in tactics 
would not have had time to produce the result credited to them under the 
consensus viewpoint.  Together, these facts suggest that the surge could not 
have produced the improvement in the security environment.  What else might 
have caused this improvement?  If we take lethality of attacks as the best 
indicator of insurgent capability, then we should look for some change that 
decreased insurgent sanctuaries and social support that preceded the surge and 
could have produced the improvement in the security environment that coincided 
with the surge.  
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR IMPROVEMENT IN 
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
A. IRAQI PROVINCIAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS 
Several critical events initiated by various Iraqi Leaders and occurring in 
late 2006 through 2007 explain the decline in violence and associated timeline 
more effectively than the U.S. Surge of forces in 2007.  These events include the 
United States’ transfer of sovereignty over the security environment to the Iraqi 
Government in January 2007; the targeting of irreconcilable insurgents and 
corrupt politicians by Iraqi Security Forces under the orders of Prime Minister 
Maliki beginning in late 2006; a political reconciliation program for former Sunni 
insurgents in January 2007; and the Sunni Awakening led by Anbari tribal 
leaders to overthrow the Al Qaeda influence in western Iraq in October 2006.  
Additionally, Maqtada al-Sadr announced a ceasefire between his Jaysh al-
Mahdi militia and government forces after the surge in August 2007, later 
improving the security environment.  Prior to Prime Minister Maliki’s orders, 
corrupt politicians, militia leaders, and power-hungry Iraqi security forces 
facilitated the support of all three insurgencies by the Iraqi population.  The 
International Crisis Group reported the following after a several-year evaluation 
of Basra that began in 2005.    
The [city government's most glaring failure was its] inability to 
establish a legitimate and functioning provincial apparatus capable 
of redistributing resources, imposing respect for the rule of law and 
ensuring a peaceful transition at the local level.  Basra’s political 
arena remains in the hands of actors engaged in bloody 
competition for resources, undermining what is left of governorate 
institutions and coercively enforcing their rule. The local population 
has no choice but to seek protection from one of the dominant 
camps.”54   
                                            
54 International crisis group, “Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra,” 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4914 (accessed April 20, 2009). 
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This assessment is representative of other major cities and provincial 
governments in Iraq, including Baghdad, where the central Government of Iraq 
suffered from the same internal problems.  
Many of the Iraqi Security Forces were entrenched in similar politically 
violent actions at the city, provincial, and national levels:  politicians were illegally 
employing some Iraqi Security Forces units as their private armies to enhance 
their positions through extreme violence.55 Additionally, control of essential 
services by such power brokers also offered them an artificial economic–political 
base of support from the affected population centers, and legitimate government 
services could not have been provided until such criminal politicians were 
removed.  Countering these mechanisms of control that insurgents, militia 
leaders, and corrupt politicians employed over population centers to maintain the 
sanctuary and support necessary for the continued insurgency was critical to the 
improvement of the security environment.  The United States Government 
Accountability Office identified the long-term requirement for sustainment of 
essential services in Iraq as necessary for improvement in the Security 
Environment as well as longer-term stability. “As U.S reconstruction efforts end, 
Iraq will need to develop the capacity to spend its resources, particularly on 
investment that will further economic development and deliver essential services 
to its people.”56 However, the Iraqi central government was not in a position to 
provide governance or support development prior to 2007.  As Kilcullen points 
out, “the [Iraqi] government was a sectarian combatant in the civil war [against 
the Sunnis] . . . not a politically neutral “honest broker” that governed in the 
interests of all Iraqis.”57 In fact, to provide the governance necessary at the 
central government level and, therefore, provide the conditions necessary for the 
                                            
55 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009) 238. Bob Woodward, 
The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 114. 
56 Government Accountability Office, “Iraq:  Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” (report 
to congressional committees, March 2009) http://www.gao.gov/index.html (accessed May 27, 
2009): 6.  
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development necessary to improve security, the government would have to 
“significantly modify its behavior if the whole population were ever to accept it as 
legitimate.”58   
Following Prime Minister Maliki's appointment in April 2006, the central 
government and subordinate politicians did begin to significantly modify their 
behavior.  Prime Minister Maliki worked throughout the remainder of the year 
toward political engagements among competing factions that aimed at reducing 
the escalating violence.  U.S. civilian and military officials considered this 
timeframe “transitional,” allowing the new government and elected officials the 
time and space necessary for policy generation and consensus.  Maliki 
approached solutions to the violence with a project called the National 
Reconciliation and Dialogue Project:  a series of conferences facilitating 
discussion among prominent and influential political and religious leaders.59 In 
August 2006, the first conference “included 500 tribal sheikhs . . . and called for 
an end to sectarian violence, the disbanding of Militias, a delay in federalism, and 
a review of de-Ba'athification reform.”60  The second conference in September 
was among civil society and political leaders, and concluded with 
recommendations for future policy considerations.61 Additionally, a religious 
leaders conference was held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in October, and included 
Shia and Sunni leadership who declared intra-Muslim attacks and suicide 
bombing a “sin,”62 thus demonstrating a previously unforeseen solidarity between 
competing sectarian factions.  This series of conferences facilitated political, 
religious, tribal, and civic discussion among prominent Iraqis while the milestone 
of a security transition to the Iraqi government loomed the following January.   
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In January 2007, the Iraqi government received a greater degree of 
sovereignty as primary responsibility for the security environment was transferred 
from Coalition forces to Iraqi security forces under government oversight.  Prime 
Minister Maliki pursued this new responsibility soon after his election by 
approving operations for select Iraqi Security Forces, such as the Iraqi Special 
Operation Forces and Provincial police SWAT teams, to serve arrest warrants 
against other corrupt Iraqi Security Forces' leadership and Iraqi Politicians63 
beginning in late 2006, thereby purging his extensively corrupt central 
government and police forces of nefarious characters.  In doing so, he improved 
the measure of legitimacy for the Iraqi government while also ensuring that policy 
generation was less self-serving for the politicians involved and that the Iraqi 
Security Forces better represented the population which they served.   
Prime Minister Maliki supplemented this arrest effort with a political 
reconciliation program for former insurgent leaders or ranking militia members—
primarily those engaged in sectarian violence or those who attacked coalition 
forces—in order to allow them to “opt out” of the fighting and overcome the 
exhaustive criminal investigations already overwhelming the investigative-judge 
type judicial system.64 Concurrently with the surge and political/Iraqi Security 
Forces purging in 2007, Prime Minister Maliki ordered an amnesty program,65 
whereby former low-level insurgents were granted amnesty for their criminal 
actions if they fit within the stringent amnesty protocol.66 The U.S. Military and 
the Iraqi government began incorporating reconciled insurgents into security 
programs such as the “Sons of Iraq”67 beginning in late 2006, providing a  
 
 
                                            
63 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 256. 
64 Ibid., 354. 
65 Ibid. 
66 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 179. 
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government income and a second chance for de-radicalized Iraqis.  This effort 
drastically reduced both the number of insurgent fighters and the passive support 
of them by the population. 
Among his initial efforts as Prime Minister, Maliki began planning for a 
significant overhaul of Baghdad Security in the fall of 2006.  He implemented 
operation Fard al-Qanoon (FAQ), or the “Baghdad Security Plan,” surging three 
additional Iraqi Army Brigades (50,000–60,000 Iraqi Troops total)68 into Baghdad 
in December 2006 to quell the sectarian violence—well prior to the arrival of U.S. 
surge forces.  The “plan divided Baghdad into 10 districts with an Iraqi [Army] 
Brigade in every district.  Iraqi Police and some U.S. and coalition forces would 
aid them.  It included the imposition of military law on Baghdad to keep the Shia 
militias and the mostly Shia police force from operating by themselves in Sunni 
Areas.”69 This effort publically demonstrated the Prime Minister's recognition of 
the corruption within his primarily Shia police forces, and was considered another 
olive branch toward the Sunni population.   
Although Ricks and other authors note the level of corruption within the 
political architecture and security apparatus prior to 2007, many Iraqis were later 
grateful for the presence of reliable Iraqi Security Forces in late 2008.70 The 
reason for this change of opinion was a comprehensive overhauling of nefarious 
Iraqi Security Forces leadership at all levels (primarily among Shia, as the 
majority of Iraqi Security Forces were Shia employed by the Shia government) 
and the purging in 2006 and 2007 of corrupt representatives within the 
government's ministries under the approval of Prime Minister Maliki.  By 
removing corrupt Iraqi Security Forces leadership, Iraqi Security Forces' missions 
began to degrade insurgent sanctuary and social support.  Similar efforts were 
ongoing at the provincial levels, where Iraqi Security Forces began to target 
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criminal politicians in late 2006 for arrest under the authority of warrants issued 
by legitimate Iraqi judges and the tacit approval of the Ministry of Interior.  The 
execution of these missions by Iraqis under the authority of the Iraqi Government 
established credibility and legitimacy for the Government, thereby winning 
support from the population and reducing support for the insurgents.  Although 
violence initially escalated due to conflict between AQ, Shia populations, and 
Shiite Iraqi Security Forces, the security environment improved due to the main 
political effort of the central and provincial governments approving the targeting 
of all illegitimate actors, including Shia, Sunni, and AQ through employment of 
“reliable” Iraqi Security Forces.  AQ was degraded and what remained was 
driven out of Baghdad into the northern provinces, and Shia extremists moved 
away from ethnically contested territories to other temporary sanctuary in the 
Thawra district of Baghdad, or Sadr City.  These combined efforts eliminated a 
number of corrupt power brokers who denied the larger population centers 
legitimate governmental essential services, eliminated some measure of violent 
intimidation and coercion, and enabled Iraqis to support the Iraqi Security Forces' 
targeting of insurgents, thus degrading the previously untouchable insurgent 
sanctuaries.   
The timeline for the decrease in lethality of attacks supports these 
findings.  As previously noted, the Maliki-generated August 2006 conference 
involving 500 multi-ethnic Sheikhs set the conditions for decreasing sectarian 
violence, disbanding militias, and reviewing of the unpopular de-Ba'athification 
program—the first public indication of government legitimacy.  The September 
conference supplemented the ethnic dialogue with political and policy 
considerations for the new provincial and central governments, and a delay in 
any consideration for a future federated state (Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish self-
governed territories).  Simultaneously with Prime Minister Maliki's political 
initiatives in September 2006, the influential Sunni Sheikh “Abu Risha” Sattar 
declared a tribal rebellion (the Awakening) against Al Qaeda in western Iraq's 
  31
Anbar Province,71 which was followed by unforeseen solidarity among other 
Sunni tribes.  The religious conference in Mecca, Saudi Arabia condemning intra-
Muslim violence reinforced growing convictions among Iraqi leaders that they 
were facing impending responsibility for the future of their country.  
With regard to improvement in the security environment, it is worth 
mentioning that Maqtada Al-Sadr, the politically savvy head of the Mahdi Militia, 
declared a ceasefire within his ranks in late August of 2007.72 The decline in 
insurgent lethality (CIOC Trends and SIGACTS III) is noted in Figure 4 between 
the months of August and September, and this serendipitous result is most likely 
due to Sadr's quest for a political future in Iraq versus a militant one.  
The timeline of efforts to degrade sanctuary and social support of the 
insurgents and the timeline of decreased lethality of attacks and eventually the 
numbers of attacks suggests that Iraqi political efforts accomplished in under a 
year what the United States military attacking insurgents could not accomplish 
over four years.  Although regularly overlooked by observers of the conflict, the 
data suggests that the strategies implemented by the Iraqis were the 
mechanisms of improvement in the security environment, having degraded the 
sanctuary and support networks of the insurgent organizations and ultimately 
their physical capacity and resources.  
This conclusion may appear more plausible when compared with the idea 
that the surge produced improvement in the security environment, and thus the 
military that was trained and equipped for a technology-based, culturally 
insensitive symmetric conflict was overhauled under insurgent fire and became a 
premier counterinsurgent and host nation legitimating force in just a few months 
during the surge.  To add support to the contention that the surge did not 
produce the effects often attributed to it, it is important to consider what it was 
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not, and why the lack of certain factors within surge efforts did not support long-
term improvement in the security environment. 
B. WHY THE SURGE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
In Baghdad, there was some reciprocity between surge troops and the 
Iraqi population: the protection of Iraqis fostered by U.S. forces attacking 
irreconcilable insurgents may have contributed to the improvement in the security 
environment following the surge but, as we have seen, by no means did that 
effort coincide with the decrease in lethality.  The attack effort was Baghdad-
centric and did not address the insurgents' rationing of essential services, or the 
political support for violence even in Baghdad.  This relationship between 
insurgents and the population indicates the strategy of attacking insurgents from 
dispersed bases may have provided few short-term gains, but did not generate 
enduring improvement in the security environment, as the surge strategy did not 
eliminate the key elements of insurgent success:  sanctuary and social support 
gained by the rationing of essential services discussed in Chapter II. The primary 
tactic of protecting the population in Baghdad during the surge presumed that the 
only mechanism of control by the insurgents over the population was intimidation 
and coercion, and by protecting Iraqis from this coercion, the insurgent's 
sanctuary and social support networks would dissolve.  The strategy however 
failed to address the insurgent's additional mechanisms of control, and did not 
simultaneously incorporate provision of essential services and governance into 
areas secured by surge troops.  Kilcullen points out that “effective 
counterinsurgency is a matter of good governance, backed by solid population 
security and economic development measures.“73 In Baghdad, the surge 
contributed to one of these three factors—degradation of the violence and 
intimidation as a mechanism of control—but failed to address good governance,  
 
 
                                            
73 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 60. 
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elimination of political violence, and increased economic development measures 
to counter rationing, all of which were primarily left to the Iraqis to figure out at 
the district and city levels of Baghdad.   
As briefly noted earlier, it would be foolish to argue that an effective 
strategy of attacking the enemy is unnecessary for a short-term improvement in 
the security environment:  rather, it is, in fact, useful to reduce insurgent capacity 
and resources while simultaneously attacking sanctuary and social support 
networks in order to hasten the improvement of the security environment.  
Steven Metz notes that “another lesson [can be drawn] from past 
counterinsurgency campaigns:  While the ultimate resolution of the conflict 
comes through political means, the underlying political causes of the conflict 
cannot be addressed without security.”74  The starting point for improvement is, 
therefore, security, including efforts that degrade insurgent capacity against a 
select population of insurgents.  A small number of hardcore fighters will continue 
violent attacks regardless of local conditions or criminal/political reconciliation 
programs, and can only be removed through precision operations conducted 
primarily by Special Operations Forces.75  However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the strategy of conventional units operating from centralized bases to 
conduct operations proved ineffective against an elusive enemy who maintained 
sanctuary among the population.  In these operations from 2004 through 2007  
(Fallujah 2004, Tal Afar, Mosul, and Najaf) General Purpose Forces, SF, and 
Iraqi Forces fought and won conventional attack battles.  These successes, 
though, were few compared to the nation-wide threat posed by insurgents 
disaggregated into the population.  However, these battles “proved” this 
strategy's worth to U.S. policy makers and validated the centralized-base concept 
to those commanders who did not understand a more effective strategy.  The 
                                            
74 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 183. 
75 Special Operations Force's activities in Iraq with regard to Al Qaeda and other hard-core 
fighters are not discussed in this thesis for reasons of classification of information.  However, the 
scale of improvement in the security environment is most likely not due to their counter-terror 
efforts, but Iraqi initiatives.   
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strategy of these battles was in fact “a strategy of attrition in which victory came 
from killing or capturing enemy combatants until the opponent's will collapsed . . . 
But, history suggests, it seldom brings success in counterinsurgency.”76 
Counterinsurgency theories include fundamental principles that argue for 
influencing the population for the benefit of the government and effectively 
degrading insurgent sanctuary and social support networks.  The Army's new 
manual on Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3–24 explains, “Success in 
Counterinsurgency operations requires establishing a legitimate government 
supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that 
insurgents use to gain support.”77 David Galula defines counterinsurgency victory 
in his 1964 book Counterinsurgency Warfare as “not the destruction in a given 
area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization . . . A victory is that 
plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population . . . by and with 
the population.”78 General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of the International 
Security Assistance Forces – Afghanistan, issued new guidance in August 2009:  
“an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; its supply of fighters, and even 
leadership, is effectively endless.”79 Among the many theories and practices of 
counterinsurgency is a smorgasbord of sub-strategies for the counterinsurgent to 
select from and apply in a given area, based on the unique requirements of the 
population. Many of these sub-strategies require simultaneous employment in 
the correct combinations or chronological sequence.  Four of the most basic 
combination of sub-strategies include “security, governance, development, and 
information.”80 The correct application of these ingredients for success “must be 
                                            
76 Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008): 163. 
77 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counter-
Insurgency Operations, http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine, (accessed 21 August 2009): 6–1. 
78 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, (Westport:  Praeger Security International, 
1964): 54.  
79 General Stanley McChrystal, Commander International Security Assistance Forces, “ISAF 
Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance,” http://www.nato.int/ISAF/ (accessed September 4 
2009). 
80 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 71. 
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designed to help the population choose between the government and the 
insurgent, and enforce that choice once made.”81   
If Galula and other counterinsurgency theorists are right, whatever 
attacking insurgents may have accomplished (what the surge forces did), in order 
for the security environment to improve beginning in January 2007, governance 
and development must have been provided to Iraqis and the mechanism of 
insurgent control over the population must have been severed by these means.  
It is plausible to think, therefore, that the improvement in the security 
environment came about not because of what the surge did (target insurgents) 
but because of what the Iraqis did (degrade the insurgents’ sanctuary and social 
support networks by improving governance and development).    
C. EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
The following conflict models support the evidence that political efforts at 
the tribal (in the case of Anbar), provincial, and central government levels are 
plausible explanations for the improvement in the security environment.   
Since the preliminary military effort in Iraq from 2003 to 2007 was 
attacking insurgents, and the surge intended to continue to attack insurgents 
(clear, hold, build), several strategic interaction models offer suggestions to 
translate these strategies into predictable outcomes and support the theory that 
political factors were the necessary and sufficient contributors to the 
improvement in the security environment. 
The security environment can be disaggregated into a conflict analysis of 
U.S. and Allied forces (including Iraqi Security Forces) against insurgents.  




                                            
81 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 67. 
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Strong Actors (US and Allies) and Weak Actors (insurgents).   Arrequin-Toft 
defines strong actors as those who enjoy a relative power superiority of 10:1 over 
their opponents.82   
Ivan Arreguin-Toft conducted a detailed strategic interaction analysis of 
conflicts,83 evaluating 202 cases from 1800–1998 to empirically identify the 
outcome of direct and indirect strategies employed between strong and weak 
actors.  
       Weak actor strategic approach 
       Direct   Indirect 
 
    Direct 
Strong actor strategic approach 
    Indirect 
 
Figure 4.   Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes 
(expected winners in cells) From (How the Weak Win Wars: A 
Theory of Asymmetric Conflict).84 
Arreguin-Toft conducted his analysis by arguing that there are two kinds of 
strategies which he described as direct and indirect.  “Direct strategic approaches—
e.g., conventional attack and defense—target an adversary’s armed forces with the 
aim of destroying or capturing that adversary's physical capacity to fight, thus 
                                            
82 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 3.  Arrequing-Toft does account for other security 
commitments that constrain Strong Actors from the full application of resources to a single 
conflict.  
83 Ibid. 










making will irrelevant.”85 His analysis revealed that strong actors only defeat 
weak actors when employing a like strategy, e.g. direct vs. direct or indirect vs. 
indirect.  “Indirect strategic approaches—e.g., barbarism and Guerrilla Warfare 
Strategy—most often aim to destroy an adversary's will to resist, thus making 
physical capacity irrelevant.”86  Arreguin-Toft highlights Guerilla Warfare Strategy 
(GWS) as a weak state's method of choice under the indirect strategy, 
demonstrated in Iraq by the insurgent's use of bombs, snipers, and follow-on 
information operations designed to attack the will of U.S. forces and appeal to a 
U.S. domestic audience.  For example, an elusive triggerman may remotely 
detonate a roadside bomb to kill or injure several U.S. soldiers.  This reduces the 
military strength of the strong power only a little, but the greater effect achieved 
by the attack is influencing the will to fight:  the insurgent has the ability to kill 
without being captured and then broadcast the attack through popular media.  
Over time, the continued attacks and lack of progress in mitigating these attacks 
demoralize both the strong actor and the strong actor’s domestic population, 
which becomes demoralized because its material advantage creates the 
expectation of an easy win–something which the weak actor avoids by not 
directly confronting the strong actor. 
Two essential elements of the GWS include physical or political sanctuary 
and social assistance of the local population,87 both of which are best countered 
through an indirect strategy from the strong actor.  While a direct strategy—
conventional attack—counters the insurgent's capacity to fight, by limiting his 
resources and personnel,88 it does not address the sanctuary and support 
mechanisms.  Compared to a direct strategy, an indirect strategy employed by 
                                            
85 Ibid., 34. 
86 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 34. 
87 Ibid., 33.  
88 A direct strategy is typically employed during Counter-Terrorist operations against a group 
or network of terrorists, where the number of fighters is relatively small and may be separated 
from the population–enemy-centric warfare.   
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the strong actor addresses these remaining two essentials, while also limiting 
personnel and resources.89 
 
Figure 5.   Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction (Strong Actor 
Direct/Indirect, Weak Actor Indirect) After (How the Weak Win Wars: 
A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict).90  
If Arreguin-Toft's analysis is correct, it is unlikely that a direct strategy such 
as the surge improved the security environment as observed in Iraq in 2008, or 
improved it for the long-term.  The U.S. is a strong actor and according to 
Arreguin-Toft's analysis, a strong actor wins only when it uses the same strategy 
as its opponent.  
Arreguin-Toft's strategic interaction model and its application to the United 
States conflict in Iraq is further supported by data analyzed by Lyall and Wilson in 
                                            
89 An indirect strategy is more appropriate for Counter-Insurgency operations against larger 
groups that are integrated throughout the population and receive sanctuary/significant physical or 
political support from that population–population-centric warfare.   
90 Author generated chart from information in:  Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: 
A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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2009.  Lyall and Wilson conducted a detailed conflict analysis of 300 
insurgencies occurring globally since 1800, resulting in the conclusion “that 
increasing mechanization within state militaries is primarily responsible for . . . 
states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents.”91 Their analysis reveals “that 
modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection from 
local populations.  This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents 
from noncombatants but [also] increases the difficulty in selectively applying 
rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population.  Modern militaries 
may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies.”92 As the United 
States employed the most modern military force in the world in Iraq, the inherent 
chance of success in waging counterinsurgency warfare was limited at the 
outset.   
                                            
91 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines:  Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 67–106, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/ (accessed 21 August, 2009): 67. 
92 Ibid., 2 
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Figure 6.   Lyall–Wilson Graph of Conditional Effect of Mechanization on 
Probability of Incumbent Win 1918–2005 From (Rage Against the 
Machines:  Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars). 93 
Lyall and Wilson further suggest that forces that maintain a status as an 
“occupier” during the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare are exponentially 
more likely to fail in their efforts to defeat insurgents.94 After several years of UN 
supported American sovereignty, the U.S. certainly earned the title and status of 
Occupier in Iraq, in the eyes of some Iraqis and Americans, as well as in the 
eyes of the international community. Finally, the analysis also indicates that a 
                                            
93 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines:  Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 67–106, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/ (accessed 21 August, 2009): 90.  
94 Ibid., 91.  The reduced chance of victory by an “occupier” is negative 59 percent.  This is 
irrespective of other factors that further reduce likelihood of victory.   
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country fighting insurgents who can maintain a “safe refuge,”95 or sanctuary with 
which to train, refit, and rebuild their capacity and support has an even greater 
probability of defeat.96 The conclusions drawn by Lyall and Wilson indicate that 
the United States Military was unlikely to achieve victory against Iraqi insurgents. 
                                            
95 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines:  Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 67–106, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/ (accessed 21 August, 2009): 90.  
96 Ibid.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The United States expended significant amounts of blood and treasure in 
Iraq following the 2003 invasion, tallying 34,444 casualties97 and $683.4 billion98 
in total expenditure as of early September 2009.  As United States policy makers, 
defense department officials, and analysts look for causes of stability in Iraq, it is 
extremely difficult to observe these numbers from an American viewpoint and not 
arrive at the conclusion that these sacrifices by service members and taxpayers 
contributed more directly to the security environment observed in Iraq today than 
Iraqi efforts.  However, what this analysis has revealed is that the contribution of 
surge forces likely only hastened the improvement in the security environment in 
Baghdad, but was not sufficient for the large improvements observed in a foreign 
territory occupied by United States forces.  In consideration of the efforts and 
sacrifices by the American people and allied nations in Iraq, the clear lesson is 
that a given country must be willing to support itself and rebuild following a 
devastating conflict in a manner that suits the desires of its domestic population 
and counters the conditions for insurgency.  It would further prove useful for a 
new government shaped by U.S. foreign policy efforts to reflect the familiar 
conditions of the old government. Iraq found comfort in an improved centralized 
government because it was familiar with centralized government.  Other 
countries (such as Afghanistan) may find the familiarity of a decentralized 
government more effective and suitable to the desires of the population.  The 
United States strategy toward such a country should focus primarily on 
supporting the host-nation establishment of legitimate governance, versus a 
strategy of attrition against insurgents.  This thesis has argued that it is plausible 
to conclude that the significant improvements in the security environment and 
                                            
97 Includes killed and wounded personnel.  Global Security Organization, “US Casualties in 
Iraq,” in Military Operations in South West Asia, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm (accessed September 17, 2009). 
98 National Priorities Organization, “Cost of Wars in Iraq,” in Cost of US Wars since 2001, 
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overall stability occurred because of the efforts of the host nation central and 
local governments, and the willing contribution to and support by the majority of 
the population to the Iraqi government.  The improvement in the security 
environment came after the free Iraqi elections and the subsequent policy 
changes that improved the quality of life of many Iraqis.  Although not discussed 
in this thesis, economic policies designed to streamline national expenditures 
and encourage foreign investment began to demonstrate tangible results.99 The 
ownership of the security environment by the Iraqi central government in January 
2007 forced Iraqi military leadership and policy makers to implement 
comprehensive security plans supplemented by an effective and complementary 
political protocol, and increased the quality and legitimacy of the Iraqi Security 
forces and political apparatus.  The consolidation and ratification of the Iraqi 
Constitution, while not flawless, offered a detailed set of guidelines for the 
fledgling government to operate within, improving efficiency and enhancing the 
perception of legitimacy by the population writ large.  Prime Minister Maliki's 
efforts within the political environment allowed the targeting of nefarious 
members of his own religious and political party in order to eliminate corruption, 
and only strengthened the platform of legitimacy for the central government.  
In addition to Prime Minister Maliki's political initiatives, David Kilcullen 
sums up the results of the awakening in Bob Woodward's book, and makes 
specific mention of the political-security relationship:   
The pattern we are seeing [in August 2007] runs somewhat counter 
to what we expected in the 'surge.' . . . The original concept was 
that we (the coalition and the Iraqi Government) would create 
security, which would in turn create space for a 'grand bargain' at 
the national level.  Instead, we are seeing the exact opposite:  a 




                                            
99 Congressional Research Service, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,” December 
2008 Report to Congress, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/ (accessed 
March 6, 2009). 
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major improvement in security at the local level, and . . . the United 
States . . . had to accept the solutions that Iraqis themselves had 
chosen.100 
It may be difficult and politically challenging for politicians in the United 
States and our allies to base foreign policy success on host nation leaders and 
their populations, particularly when extremely capable U.S. military commanders 
and politicians are present in the country and a suitable host nation political 
candidate is lacking.  Yet, relying on the efforts of host nation leaders and their 
populations remains the most appropriate course of action for America's 
engagement and success in small wars.   
                                            
100 Bob Woodward, The War Within (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2008): 384. 
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